- Is tested to work with SCP
- Integrates well with systemd
Download binary for your architecture. We only support Linux.
- If you don't have
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key(from previous OpenSSH installation perhaps), run
$ ./function22 host-key-generateto generate it.
$ ./function22 installto start on system startup.
These things improve security when compared to default OpenSSH installation:
- Restricts SSH listening to a VPN interface (like Tailscale), so your SSH server is not reachable directly from public internet.
- Fully memory safe implementation (Go has native support for SSH protocol).
- Less features => less attack surface.
- Only support ed25519 host key
Of course there are security points that OpenSSH is better at, like having had magnitudes of more security-conscious people looking at its source code. It is you who ultimately are responsible for your own security, so please consider all implications. :)
Why authenticate at all?
In theory since Tailscale already has "IP is identity" and network-level access controls are by user / device combos, you wouldn't need to authenticate the user at all.
I.e. IP packets arriving at the SSH server (from VPN IP range) is already a sign that user's end device passes firewall ACLs.
Currently we still do additional auth for layered security. Once we gain more confidence on the code and understand additional attack vectors better, source-IP-restricted access will be considered.
- Log all failed connection attempts (even though we have network-level security)
- Perhaps disable password authentication entirely
- Perhaps use systemd socket activation? Or is that possible when bound to a specific network interface's IP? Seems possible.
- Make this a library, so it can be embedded in other projects